Finally, the Financial Services Agency is entering the scene under the command of Makoto Watanabe?
An extremely serious whistleblower report regarding Makoto Watanabe, Representative Director, Chairman, and CEO of Last One Mile Co., Ltd., has been submitted by company executives regarding the listed company.
According to an internal whistleblower from Last Mile executives, Mr. Watanabe obtained the indictment of defendant Toshiyuki Nakano and told executives of a certain company—which he had long attacked by vowing to "drive them to delisting"—that by using its contents, he could force the company into delisting.
Furthermore, Mr. Watanabe had previously boasted to those around him that he had already sold the subject stocks because he knew the information beforehand. After that, he is reportedly spreading the contents of the indictment to Last One Mile executives, stating this time that "this is insider information."
"Only I know everything, so I sold first." On top of that, he gathered executives and spread the word, saying, "This is insider information." Among Last Mile executives, this sequence of actions has come to be called "insider harassment," and Mr. Watanabe has even earned the nickname "Wild Nabe-chan," which is completely devoid of respect.
It is only natural that the executives are crying out in distress. From that very moment, they are unilaterally dragged into issues they never wished for—hearing unpublished information from the Representative Director that they wanted nothing to do with—such as trading the related stocks, managing internal information, providing explanations to the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, and preserving communication records.
Defendant Tamaki Nakano tried to use the police as a means to attack others, but in the end became the subject of criminal proceedings himself. Is it now Mr. Watanabe's strategy to bring in the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Commission as a means to attack the target company, only to end up having his own trading history investigated?
If Makoto Watanabe's command is finally bringing the Financial Services Agency to Last One Mile Inc., the first thing that should be checked is not the target company's problems. It is when and what Mr. Watanabe himself knew, which stocks he sold, in which account, and when.
The indictment of Defendant Tamaki Nakano, distributed to Last One Mile executives, which could lead to delisting
According to an internal whistleblowing report from a last-mile executive, Makoto Watanabe told multiple executives regarding the indictment of defendant Toshiyuki Nakano that, rather than simply explaining he had learned the details of the criminal case, he suggested that using the indictment would allow him to drive the company he has been hostile toward into delisting.
The prosecutors' union from the other media outlet, "Okami's Union,"The issue involving an internal whistleblowing report from the secretary of Last One Mile executive Makoto Watanabe, stating that Watanabe, in coordination with a lawyer, obtained an indictment containing details of accomplices from the National Tax Agency and the public prosecutors office.is pursuing.
This time, additional information provided by last-mile executives indicates that the indictment was not only delivered to Mr. Watanabe's hands, but is also being explained to the executive team as ammunition to drive the target company toward delisting.
While claiming to have obtained an indictment that could lead to delisting, they previously said they sold their shares early because they were the only ones who knew the information. Now, on top of that, they are spreading it to executives, calling it insider information. Aren't even executives who were forced to hear unwanted information going to get dragged into dealing with the Financial Services Agency?
This is not a funny story about the representative of a listed company bragging about having "amazing information."
If the timeline is such that he learned important unpublished information, sold his stocks first, and then distributed the same information to company executives, at least the following facts can be immediately verified through securities accounts, communication records, meeting minutes, and indictment acquisition history.
- The date and time when Makoto Watanabe first learned the contents of the indictment.
- The person who conveyed the indictment or its contents, a lawyer, a national tax official, or a prosecutor-related person.
- The target companies and issues that Mr. Watanabe explained could be delisted.
- The stock, number of shares, sale price, and date and time of sale that Mr. Watanabe said he sold.
- Transactions conducted under the names of Mr. Watanabe himself, his relatives, close aides, affiliated corporations, and other names.
- Date and time when the target information was disclosed by the company or the market.
- The scope of executives to whom Mr. Watanabe conveyed information, the date and time, the location, and the content of his statements.
- Stock trading by related parties conducted after sharing information with executives.
Transaction history doesn't vanish like memories of a drinking party. Whether under one's own name, or the name of relatives, acquaintances, related companies, or others, if the SESC examines the trading records and the flow of funds, the actual user and timing of the trades will become clear.
If "I was the only one who sold first" is true, the transaction history tells the whole story.
Article 166 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act regulates acts where company insiders or primary recipients of information learn undisclosed material facts concerning a listed company and buy or sell the subject securities before those facts are made public.
Important facts are not limited to individually enumerated items such as mergers, business alliances, and earnings revisions. There is also a so-called basket clause, which covers facts that have a significant impact on investors' investment decisions regarding the management, business, or property of a listed company.
If Mr. Watanabe himself explained that "with this indictment, the company can be delisted" and "this is insider information," it means he was aware of the importance that this information held for stock prices and investment decisions.
What is even more problematic is not just the day the indictment itself was received. If, before receiving the physical document, the contents, accomplices, additional indictments, arrests, or impact on the target company were communicated orally or via message by the national tax authorities, prosecutors, defense counsel, or others, what matters is the "date on which the contents were first known."
If you sold them after that day and before the public announcement, simply explaining that you formally received the indictment after the sale will not fly.
Article 167-2 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act also regulates the acts of communicating undisclosed material facts or recommending transactions for the purpose of having others gain profits or avoid losses.
Therefore, the legal structure to be confirmed in this case is extremely clear.
- Did Makoto Watanabe sell shares after learning about undisclosed material facts and before they were made public?
- Based on the information acquisition route, does Mr. Watanabe fall under the category of a company insider, a contract signatory, or a primary information recipient?
- Was the content of the indictment a material fact that would significantly affect the investment decisions regarding the target company?
- Did Mr. Watanabe sell the shares before the information disclosure to avoid his own losses?
- Was the purpose of communicating the information to executives stock trading, applying pressure to the target company, or distributing responsibility?
- Did executives who received the information, or people close to them, trade the target stocks before the announcement?
If Mr. Watanabe's explanation is true, it is subject to investigation under Articles 166 and 167-2 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.
Conversely, if the claims about an "indictment enabling delisting," "insider information," and "selling only one's own shares first" are false and were spread to intimidate the target company and impact its stock price or reputation, this would in turn raise issues regarding the dissemination of rumors and fraudulent schemes under Article 158 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, as well as the suitability of the listed company's representative and the company's internal controls.
Whether true, it's the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Whether false, it's the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act and internal controls. Unusually, there is no escape hatch in the explanation Mr. Watanabe created himself.
"Insider harassment": unilaterally changing executives into information recipients
When Last Mile executives call this behavior "insider harassment," it is not mere wordplay.
After boasting that he sold his own shares first, the representative director unilaterally forces an executive who has no desire to hear it to listen to information he knows to be material non-public information. As a result, the executive who is made to listen to it is left having to worry about everything from securities transactions for himself and his family, reporting to the company, audit responses, inquiries from the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, to the impact on his future career.
Merely being on the receiving end of unilateral information does not automatically make an executive a violator. Rather, they are victims who were bombarded with unwanted information by the representative and thrown into market regulatory peril by the company's inadequate management structure.
However, if you buy or sell related stocks after learning that information, even if you had no intention of violating the rules, you will be required to provide an explanation regarding the timing of the trades, the content of the information, and the acquisition route. If Mr. Watanabe disseminates information without any management, even the securities transactions in the private lives of executives will be restricted by the representative's retaliation plan.
We didn't want to know that information. We feared we would even be checked on whether we held shares in the target company and get dragged into explaining things to the Financial Services Agency or the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. Please don't make only the executives the recipients of insider information after the representative sells first and escapes.
What the company should do is not increase the number of executives who listen to Mr. Watanabe's tales of valor. Instead, it should immediately determine the scope of those who received the information, and rather than blaming the individuals involved, it should restrict trading in the relevant stocks, preserve records, conduct an independent legal review, and report to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.
Is defendant Tamaki Nakano planning to bring in the police, and Makoto Watanabe the Financial Services Agency, on their own?
Among last-mile executives, a very clear irony regarding this current structure is spreading.
Defendant Tamayoshi Nakano attempted to use the police and investigative agencies as a means of attacking others, only to end up entering criminal proceedings himself. Makoto Watanabe attempted to use the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission as pressure against a rival company, only to end up having his own trading history, information acquisition routes, and accounts under the names of relatives and affiliated companies investigated.
It's a self-inflicted authority-inviting operation where you get investigated by the national agency you called yourself.
There are even internal rumors that Mr. Watanabe might be arrested by the Financial Services Agency. In actual procedures, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Financial Services Agency investigates trading records and information transmission, issues a recommendation for a administrative monetary penalty order, and accuses malicious criminal offenses to the public prosecutor.
In other words, the Financial Services Agency is not going to show up at the last mile with handcuffs. However, if the Securities and Surveillance Commission investigates the trades and proceeds to file charges, criminal proceedings by prosecutors will follow. The executives' sarcastic remark that "we're going to be arrested by the Financial Services Agency" skips the sequence of procedures, but it hits the nail on the head in the sense that Watanabe is inviting the market surveillance authority upon himself.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating transactions using not only accounts in a person's own name, but also borrowed-name accounts belonging to relatives, acquaintances, and others. This is not an organization that will accept explanations such as "it's safe because I didn't sell it under my own name," "it's unrelated because it's not the company's account," or "there are no records because I only spoke to executives verbally."
By aligning the meeting records, internal chats, emails, call logs, and the dates and times of Mr. Watanabe's statements held by the last-mile executives with the trading records held by the securities company, the truth or falsity of the statement "I was the only one who sold first" can be easily determined.
Providing information to the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance CommissionSecurities and Exchange Surveillance Commission Information Provider Windoware accepted. Insider trading, market manipulation, financial statement falsification, and other market abuses are precisely the issues handled by that desk.
Makoto Watanabe, who gathers leaked information from the National Tax Agency and prosecutors, and now brings in even the Financial Services Agency
This problem did not begin suddenly.
Defendant TSUKI Nakano had previously stated the intent that "he had the National Tax Agency on his side." In fact, internal whistleblowing from Last One Mile executives and secretaries has successively revealed several issues: the issue where only Makoto Watanabe's seized items were returned earlier than those of other parties concerned; the issue where arrest information and investigation policies from the National Tax Agency and prosecutors were leaked to Watanabe's side; and the issue where an indictment containing details of the accomplices was obtained.
The prosecutors' union from the other media outlet, "Okami's Union,"An article pursuing the leak of a Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau inspection date and the prior disclosure of passport return information by the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors OfficeAnd they are pointing out the perverted structure in which those who could become targets of investigation use information leaked from the national tax authorities and prosecutors as their own source of information.
Boasting to those around him that he had forced the National Tax Agency—which he jokingly calls the "weakest"—to return seized items and managed to obtain arrest information and the indictment, Mr. Watanabe then distributed this as "insider information" to Last Mile executives.
There are even bitter laughs coming from last-mile executives, saying, "Isn't this just one foolish middle-aged man shaking up the National Tax Agency—which he calls the weakest—and spreading picked-up investigation info while bragging that 'I'm the only one who knows everything'?"
If this is what Mr. Watanabe calls "advanced management," what is being managed is not a business. It is a crisis process chart spanning national institutions and a listed company, concerning what can be extracted from the National Tax Agency, what can be leaked from the prosecutor's office, who gets to be sold to first, and who gets dragged in later as an information recipient.
And now, the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission are about to join this schedule. The authorities that Mr. Watanabe wanted to bring in to have the target company delisted might be the very ones investigating Mr. Watanabe himself first.
"Wild Be-chan" is not a tale of heroic deeds, but an internal control failure at a listed company
Among last-mile executives, Makoto Watanabe is called "Wild Nabe-chan" not because his bold management decisions are praised.
It is irony directed at a publicly traded company's representative, who should understand the risks under market regulations, yet single-handedly ruins information management and shifts the consequences onto subordinates—all while boasting about being the only one who knew the information, talking about selling stock first, and only later explaining to executives that the same information constitutes "insider information."
If it truly is a material non-public fact, Mr. Watanabe's trading and tipping become an issue. If it is not a material non-public fact, it means he coerced executives and the target company using delisting or an indictment as leverage, exaggerating his own influence.
If you really sold them first, please provide the transaction history. If you did not sell them, please explain why the representative of a listed company bragged to executives about a fictitious insider trading as a tale of valor.
Even more serious is the fact that, because Mr. Watanabe disseminated information to executives, even Last One Mile Inc.'s own internal control posture will become subject to verification by the SESC.
- Did the internal system for identifying and managing material facts function properly?
- Was there a system in place for prior application or post-verification of securities transactions by the Representative Director?
- Were you compiling a list of recipients of important information communicated to officers and employees?
- Did you instruct the internal team to suspend trading of the target stock?
- Did you report to the Board of Directors, the Audit and Supervisory Committee, the Legal Department, the Internal Audit Department, and the IR Department?
- Have you considered reporting this to the accounting auditor, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, major shareholders, and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission?
- Have you taken protective measures to ensure that the executives who were provided with the information do not suffer any disadvantage?
Do not pass the bill for the "wildness" of a listed company's representative on to the shareholders and employees.
Records that last-mile executives must preserve immediately
This time, the last-mile executives who were unilaterally given the information need to independently record the facts they saw and heard, so that Watanabe's remarks do not make them out to be violators themselves.
Rather than altering company originals or taking them out without authorization, please organize the existence, storage location, date, and participants of the following records to the extent that they can be legitimately verified.
- Date and time, location, and attendees of Makoto Watanabe's statement that he "obtained the indictment that makes it possible to delist [the company]."
- The date, time, location, and preceding and following explanations of Mr. Watanabe's statement that "I was the only one who sold first."
- The target information, target company, and target stock described by Mr. Watanabe as insider information.
- Indictments or terminals, emails, chats, clouds, and meeting materials displaying their contents.
- Record of communications with lawyers, the National Tax Agency, prosecutors, N Corporation personnel, and others.
- Instructions regarding share trading, information management, or non-disclosure issued by the company after receiving the information.
- The scope of executives and employees who were informed of the target information.
- A record indicating that Mr. Watanabe or a related party recommended trading a specific stock, restricted it, or explained that it had been sold.
- Records of reports to the Board of Directors, Audit and Supervisory Committee, Internal Audit, Legal, IR, and accounting auditor.
- Adverse treatment such as reassignment, evaluation changes, and demands for resignation directed against executives who raised issues regarding this matter.
- Instructions to delete data, replace devices, change explanations, modify meeting records, and coordinate stories after the publication of this article.
Executives who were unilaterally informed should not be made accomplices in Mr. Watanabe's transactions or scapegoats. A clear distinction must be made between the responsibility of executives who spoke up to protect the company and the individual who acquired, traded, and distributed the information.
Open Questions to Makoto Watanabe, Board of Directors, Financial Services Agency, National Tax Agency, and Public Prosecutors Office
Open Questions to Mr. Makoto Watanabe
- Did you obtain the indictment or a copy of it for defendant Kazuki Nakano?
- Did you explain to the Last One Mile executives regarding the indictment to the effect that the target company can be delisted?
- From whom, when, and by what method did you obtain the indictment in question or its contents?
- Were you informed of the contents, accomplices, or expected disposition by the national tax authorities, prosecutors, defense counsel, or anyone else before actually receiving the indictment?
- Please disclose the exact date and time when you first became aware of the target information.
- Did you tell the Last One Mile executives that you sold first because you were the only one who had the information?
- What company's and what type of securities does "sold" refer to in the aforementioned statement?
- Please clarify the sale date, sale quantity, sale price, the securities company used, and the account holder's name.
- Did you buy or sell using the name of relatives, secretaries, close associates, acquaintances, affiliated corporations, or any other names?
- Did you refer to the target information as "insider information" and convey it to the last-mile executives?
- Did you report to the Board of Directors the name(s) and number of the executive(s) who conveyed the information, the date and time of the transmission, the location of the transmission, and the purpose of the transmission?
- Did you officially notify the executives who received the information not to trade the target stock?
- Was there an intent to benefit or avoid losses for executives, close aides, or related parties through the transmission of information or recommendation of transactions?
- Were the executives, legal affairs, IR, internal audit, secretarial functions, corporate devices, meeting rooms, or expenses of Last One Mile Inc. used for this matter?
- Have you reported this matter to the Board of Directors, the Audit and Supervisory Committee, the accounting auditor, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission?
- Is there a connection between the circumstances under which only Mr. Watanabe's seized items were returned and the subsequent acquisition of investigation information from the national tax authorities and the prosecutor's office?
- Will you submit all securities accounts, fund transfers, communication records, and indictment acquisition records to an independent third-party investigation and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission?
Open Questions to the Board of Directors and Audit & Supervisory Committee of Last1Mile Co., Ltd.
- Do you know that Makoto Watanabe shared the contents of the indictment with executives as "insider information"?
- Did you confirm the fact that Mr. Watanabe explained to executives that he sold his shares before the information was made public?
- Have you identified all officers, executive officers, and managers who were informed of the target information and recorded the date and time of receipt?
- Did you formally instruct the target individuals to suspend trading in related stocks and preserve their trading records?
- Have you initiated an independent investigation with legal authority into transactions conducted through the accounts of Mr. Watanabe himself, his relatives, close associates, related corporations, and others?
- Have you taken measures to suspend the retention of indictments, emails, chats, phone calls, company devices, meeting records, and cloud data?
- Did you exclude Mr. Watanabe from the selection of the investigation contractor, evidence management, interviews with related parties, and approval of the investigation results?
- Have you reported this matter to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the accounting auditor, and major shareholders?
- Have you considered the impact of this matter on the internal control report, timely disclosure, director eligibility, and the maintenance of listing?
- Do you explicitly state that you will not subject executives who make whistleblowing reports to searches, device checks, reassignments, demotions, performance evaluation changes, demands for resignation, or any other unfavorable treatment?
- Will you formally conduct a fitness assessment, including the dismissal of Mr. Watanabe from his position as Representative Director, Chairman, and CEO?
Open letter of inquiry to the Financial Services Agency, the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange
- Will you investigate the whistleblower report alleging that Mr. Makoto Watanabe sold shares after learning of unpublished information, prior to its public announcement?
- Do you confirm the trading of the target stock through accounts belonging to Mr. Watanabe himself, his relatives, close associates, related corporations, or others?
- Will you verify whether the contents of the indictment constitute a material fact under Article 166 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act?
- Shall we verify Mr. Watanabe's information acquisition route and his position as a company insider or primary information recipient?
- Shall we investigate the relationship with Article 167-2 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act regarding the transmission of information to last-mile executives?
- Will you investigate statements such as "an indictment that could lead to delisting" and "I sold my shares first" as the dissemination of rumors, fraudulent means, or acts that undermine market fairness if they are false?
- Will you investigate whether Last One Mile Inc.'s material fact management, officer and employee trading management, insider registration, and whistleblower system were functioning?
- If facts that have a significant impact on the market are identified as a result of the investigation, will you take measures such as recommending a administrative monetary penalty, conducting a criminal investigation, filing an accusation, or other actions?
Public questionnaire to the relevant National Tax Agency and Prosecutors Office
- Have you provided Makoto Watanabe or his lawyer with the indictment, accomplice information, arrest information, or disposition prospects of defendant Toshiyuki Nakano?
- Do you retain the access logs, printing history, transmission records, and external contact records of personnel who have accessed the indictment or related information?
- Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Watanabe used the information in question for stock trading and putting pressure on other companies?
- Can you clarify the decision-maker, the timing of the decision, and the specific reasons for returning only Mr. Watanabe's seized items?
- Will you independently investigate communications, meetings, material exchanges, and information provision between Mr. Watanabe and National Tax and Prosecutor officials?
- If investigative information leaked from a national government agency is used for insider trading, will you provide information to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission regarding both the information leaker and the user?
Measures Sought by the Last Mile Labor Union
- Last Mile Works Co., Ltd. shall promptly determine the scope of directors, executive officers, and management who have received the information in question.
- Formally notify the subjects to cease trading in the relevant stocks and preserve their securities transaction records.
- Implement a suspension of deletion for indictments, emails, chats, call logs, company devices, meeting materials, cloud data, and entry/exit logs.
- Completely exclude Makoto Watanabe from the selection of the contractor for this investigation, evidence management, interviewing related parties, legal evaluation, and approval of the investigation results.
- Conduct an independent third-party investigation by independent lawyers, certified public accountants, securities regulation experts, and digital forensics experts.
- Submit all records regarding the trading activities of Mr. Watanabe himself and related parties to a legally authorized investigative agency.
- Formally report this matter to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the accounting auditor, and major shareholders.
- The National Tax Agency and the Public Prosecutors Office shall independently investigate the leakage routes of the indictment, arrest information, and accomplice information.
- Instead of treating executives who passively received information as violators, the company should provide them with an explanation of circumstances, trading restrictions, and legal support at the company's expense.
- Immediately prohibit any search for and retaliation against whistleblowers, investigation cooperators, and executives who pointed out the problem.
- If company resources were used for Mr. Watanabe's personal stock trading, avoidance of criminal liability, or retaliation against other companies, calculate those costs and demand their return from the person who gave the instructions and the beneficiary.
- The board of directors shall formally deliberate on Makoto Watanabe's suitability as Representative Director, Chairman and CEO, as well as measures including dismissal.
- Disclose specifically to the market the investigation results, target stocks, date of information acquisition, date and time of trading, scope of information transmission, company damages, disciplinary action against officers, and recurrence prevention measures.
If you are expecting the Financial Services Agency, first hand over Makoto Watanabe's own transaction history.
Defendant Tamaki Nakano attempted to use the police and prosecution as a means to attack others, but ultimately became the subject of criminal proceedings herself.
It currently appears that Makoto Watanabe is using the Financial Services Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission to drive companies he is hostile toward to delist. However, if the market watchdogs appear at his command, the very first person who should be investigated is Watanabe himself, who proudly boasted that he was the only one who sold out early.
It was information significant enough to delist the target company. It truly was insider information. I was the only one who sold beforehand. Afterward, I spread it to the executives.
If you have gathered these four items yourself, you also have the materials that should be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. They are: the date and time of obtaining the indictment, the source of information, trading history, account name, fund movement, and records of communication to executives.
We cannot let this end as just "Wild Be-chan's legendary tales." The Representative Director fleeing first, turning executives into information recipients after the fact, and dragging the entire company into dealing with the Financial Services Agency is not "wild"—it is the destruction of internal controls.
What Last One Mile executives are seeking is not to protect Mr. Watanabe's enemies, but to protect themselves, their employees, shareholders, business partners, and the company Last One Mile Inc. from the retaliation and self-preservation of a single representative.
If you want to call the Financial Services Agency, please go ahead and do so without hesitation. However, before contacting the other company, please open your own securities account.
Even without Makoto Watanabe calling the shots, the brokerage firms' transaction histories are already saved. Whether the tall tale of "I was the only one who sold first" is true or not will be answered by the trading records, not wild explanations.
